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 Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.  My name 
is Lisa Heinzerling.  I am a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University 
Law Center.  After law school at the University of Chicago, I clerked for 
Judge Richard Posner on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
and then for Justice William Brennan of the U.S. Supreme Court.  I was an 
Assistant Attorney General in the Environmental Protection Division of the 
Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office for three years before coming to 
Georgetown in 1993.  My expertise is in environmental and administrative 
law.  Perhaps most pertinent to today’s hearing, I was the lead author of the 
winning briefs for Massachusetts and other petitioners in Massachusetts v. 
EPA.  
  
 I commend the Select Committee for convening this hearing on the 
implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and 
the Administration’s response to that decision to date.  In this testimony, I 
discuss the following issues: 
 
(1) EPA’s obligations and authority under the Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA; 
 
(2) the implications of the Energy Security and Independence Act of 
2007 for EPA’s obligations and authority under the Clean Air Act; 
 
(3) EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson’s recent formal statement on 
the causes and consequences of climate change; 
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(4) the implications of the latter statement for regulatory programs 
under the Clean Air Act; and  
 
(5) the EPA Administrator’s obligation to make a finding (if he is not 
deemed to have done so already) with respect to whether greenhouse 
gases are endangering public health or welfare. 
 
I.  EPA’s Obligations and Authority Under Massachusetts v. EPA   
 
 In Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007), the Supreme Court 
held that greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” within the meaning of the 
Clean Air Act and that the Act gives EPA authority to regulate them.  In 
addition, the Court held that EPA could not refuse to exercise this authority 
by citing policy considerations not enumerated in the statute or by referring 
generally to the scientific uncertainty remaining with respect to climate 
change. 
 
 Two aspects of the Supreme Court’s decision are particularly relevant 
to this hearing.  The first is the Court’s directive to EPA about what the 
agency may and may not lawfully do on remand.  The second is the Court’s 
treatment of EPA’s argument that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(“EPCA”) precludes EPA regulation of greenhouse gases from motor 
vehicles under the Clean Air Act. 
 
 The Court made several important observations about EPA’s 
obligations on remand.  First, it held that EPA must regulate greenhouse 
gases from motor vehicles if the agency finds that they may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.  (“If EPA makes a finding 
of endangerment, the Clean Air Act requires the agency to regulate 
emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor vehicles.”  127 S.Ct. 
at 1462.)  Second, to avoid regulating greenhouse gases, EPA must make 
one of two findings.  Either the agency must find that greenhouse gases may 
not reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare or it must 
conclude that there is not enough information to make a decision on 
endangerment.  (“EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines 
that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides 
some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its 
discretion to determine whether they do…. If the scientific uncertainty is so 
profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to 
whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, EPA must say 
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so…. The statutory question is whether sufficient information exists to make 
an endangerment finding.”  127 S.Ct. at 1462-63.)  The Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA thus directs EPA to follow the scientific evidence on 
climate change wherever it leads and to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
from motor vehicles if that scientific evidence shows endangerment. 
  
 Another aspect of the Court’s decision pertinent to this hearing is the 
Court’s rejection of EPA’s argument that EPCA demonstrated a 
Congressional intent to preclude regulation of greenhouse gases under the 
Clean Air Act.  In concluding that it lacked authority to regulate greenhouse 
gases, EPA had explained: 
 
Even if [greenhouse gases] were air pollutants generally subject to 
regulation under the [Clean Air Act], Congress has not authorized the 
Agency to regulate CO2 emissions from motor vehicles to the extent 
such standards would effectively regulate the fuel economy of 
passenger cars and light duty trucks… At present, the only practical 
way to reduce tailpipe emissions of CO2 is to improve fuel 
economy…. EPCA is the only statutory vehicle for regulating the fuel 
economy of cars and light duty trucks. 
 
68 Fed. Reg. 52922, 52929 (emphasis added).  The Court rejected this 
argument:  
 
[T]hat DOT sets mileage standards in no way licenses EPA to shirk its 
environmental responsibilities.  EPA has been charged with protecting 
the public’s ‘health’ and ‘welfare,’ 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), a statutory 
obligation wholly independent of DOT’s mandate to promote energy 
efficiency.  See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, § 2(5), 89 Stat. 
874, 42 U.S.C. § 6201(5).  The two obligations may overlap, but there 
is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their 
obligations yet avoid inconsistency. 
 
127 S.Ct. at 1462.  The Court’s one-paragraph dismissal of an argument that 
had occupied a central place in EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions speaks volumes: the Court simply did not buy the idea that fuel 
economy standards under EPCA and emissions standards under the Clean 
Air Act could not peacefully co-exist.  Yet, as I next explain, that discredited 
argument appears to be enjoying a renaissance within the Administration. 
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II.  EISA and the Clean Air Act 
 
 Hints abound that the Administration believes that Congress, through 
the passage of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”), 
undid EPA’s obligation to take action in response to Massachusetts v. EPA.  
In announcing his decision to deny California a waiver for its program 
regulating greenhouse gases from motor vehicles, for example, EPA 
Administrator Stephen Johnson stated that “the solution” to the problem of 
climate change “must” extend “far beyond the borders of the California” and 
pointedly cited the EISA in concluding that this legislation would “bring a 
much needed national approach to addressing global climate change.”  Letter 
from Stephen Johnson to Arnold Schwarzenegger (December 19, 2007), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf.  Similarly, 
in a letter to Sierra Club attorney David Bookbinder describing EPA’s 
response to Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA’s Principal Deputy Assistant 
Administrator, Robert J. Meyers, invoked EISA in noting that “EPA is 
analyzing how to proceed on the issues before us” on the remand from 
Massachusetts v. EPA, and declined to state any “specific timeline for 
responding to the remand.”  The implication of statements such as these is 
that EPA believes that the passage of EISA somehow affected its obligations 
on the remand.  But EISA did no such thing. 
 
 As I have discussed, the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA 
that fuel economy standards under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(EPCA) and emissions standards under the Clean Air Act may comfortably 
co-exist.  The portions of the EISA dealing with fuel economy are 
amendments to EPCA; they revise EPCA’s existing standards for fuel 
economy.  EISA, H.R. 6, § 102 (amending 49 U.S.C. § 32902).  Just as the 
fuel economy standards existing at the time of Massachusetts v. EPA could 
exist side-by-side with emissions standards under the Clean Air Act, so too 
are the new fuel economy standards called for by EISA fully consistent with 
emissions standards under the Clean Air Act.  The Court’s opinion was not 
dependent on the particular content of the fuel economy standards 
themselves, but on the structure of the two statutes in general.  That structure 
remains compatible with Clean Air Act regulation notwithstanding the 
passage of EISA. 
 
 Indeed, EISA itself makes clear that Congress had no intention of 
erasing or altering EPA’s obligations under the Clean Air Act.  Right up-
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front, in section 3 of EISA, Congress provided: “Except to the extent 
expressly provided in this Act or an amendment made by this Act, nothing in 
this Act or an amendment made by this Act supersedes, limits the authority 
provided or responsibility conferred by, or authorizes any violation of any 
provision of law (including a regulation), including any energy or 
environmental law or regulation.”  EISA, H.R. 6, § 3.  The import of this 
provision could not be plainer: EISA simply does not change EPA’s existing 
obligations – including those obligations described by the Supreme Court in 
Massachusetts v. EPA – under the Clean Air Act.  Any suggestion to the 
contrary ignores the express text of EISA. 
 
 EISA does not in any way change EPA’s obligations on remand from 
Massachusetts v. EPA.  EISA affects neither EPA’s legal obligations with 
respect to determining whether greenhouse gases may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare or the regulatory obligations 
that flow from such a determination.  This conclusion follows both from the 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and from the explicit language of EISA. 
 
III.  EPA’s Recent Endangerment Finding 
 
 On February 29, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson issued the 
formal explanation of his previously announced decision to deny California 
a waiver for its program regulating greenhouse gas emissions from motor 
vehicles.  Administrator Johnson concluded that California did not meet the 
Clean Air Act’s requirement that, before a waiver may be granted, the State 
must have “compelling and extraordinary conditions.”  73 Fed. Reg. 12156.  
He explained that California’s problems relating to climate change were not 
“compelling and extraordinary” – not because they do not exist, but because 
they are no worse than the very bad problems the rest of the country faces as 
a result of climate change.  73 Fed. Reg. at 12163-12168.  Thus, in the 
course of denying California's waiver, the EPA Administrator made explicit, 
for the first time, his view that greenhouse gases endanger public health and 
welfare. 
 
 Administrator Johnson’s decision contains a long discussion of the 
effect of greenhouse gases on climate and the effect of climate change on 
public health and welfare.  The EPA Administrator states that “warming of 
the climate system is unequivocal.”  73 Fed. Reg. at 12165.  He connects 
this warming to manmade greenhouse gases and describes the consequences 
of global warming for human health and welfare.  For example: “[t]here is 
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strong evidence that global sea level gradually rose in the 20th century and is 
currently rising at an increased rate” (73 Fed. Reg. at 12165); “[b]y the end 
of the century, globally averaged sea level is projected to rise between 0.18 
and 0.59 meters relative to around 1990” (73 Fed. Reg. at 12166); “[i]t is 
very likely that heat waves will become more intense, more frequent, and 
longer lasting…” (73 Fed. Reg. at 12166); “[i]t is likely that hurricanes will 
become more intense…” (73 Fed. Reg. at 12166; “…wildfire and insect 
oubreaks are increasing and are likely to intensify…” (73 Fed. Reg. at 
12167). 
 
 These statements demonstrate that the Administrator has concluded 
that greenhouse gases are endangering, and may reasonably be anticipated to 
continue to endanger, public health and welfare.  For one thing, the 
Administrator does not equivocate about existing problems relating to 
climate change or about the likelihood of future harms.  His findings – 
including words such as “unequivocal” and “likely” – easily meet the Clean 
Air Act's standard of reasonable anticipation of endangerment.  Indeed, the 
endangerment standard was amended in 1977 precisely in order to make 
clear that scientific certainty (or, to put it another way, “unequivocal” 
evidence) was not necessary for a finding of endangerment.  Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1447 n. 7.  Moreover, Administrator Johnson’s decision 
contains numerous examples of “observed” climate change due to 
greenhouse gases (73 Fed. Reg. at 12165-66); no “reasonable anticipation” 
is required when harm is already upon us.  
 
 In addition, the Administrator's description of the consequences of 
climate change relate directly to the key Clean Air Act concepts of public 
health and welfare.  Hurricanes, wildfires, and the rest all clearly implicate 
health and welfare.  In addition, regarding public health, the Administrator 
states, for example, that the increased magnitude and duration of severe heat 
waves will “likely” lead to “increases in mortality and morbidity, especially 
among the elderly, young and frail.”  73 Fed. Reg. at 12167.  He also 
observes that “[c]limate change is expected to lead to increases in ozone 
pollution, with associated risks in respiratory infection and aggravation of 
asthma,” and that “[o]zone exposure also may contribute to premature death 
in people with heart and lung disease.”  73 Fed. Reg. at 12167.1  As for 
                                                 
1 The latter statement is followed by a footnote which instructs: “But see 
discussion above.”  73 Fed. Reg. at 12167 n. 65.  The reference is 
mysterious; nothing in the Administrator’s preceding discussion even relates 
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welfare, the Act broadly defines effects on “welfare” to include – though 
they are “not limited to” – “effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, 
manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, 
damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as 
well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-
being…”  42 U.S.C. § 7602(h).  In addition to the heat waves, hurricanes, 
wildfires, and insect outbreaks already discussed, the Administrator also 
predicts “the spread of invasive species,” the disruption of ecosystem 
services, and “significant adverse effects on certain vegetation” due to 
increased ozone pollution.  73 Fed. Reg. at 12167.  Such findings 
indisputably pertain to “welfare” as defined in the Clean Air Act. 
 
 These formal conclusions – announced by the EPA Administrator 
himself, after notice and opportunity for public comment on the decision 
whether to grant a waiver for California’s program (73 Fed. Reg. at 12157) – 
amount to a finding of “endangerment” as contemplated in numerous 
provisions of the Clean Air Act. 
 
 Although the EPA Administrator has stated that his formal factual 
findings do not amount to an “endangerment finding” under the Clean Air 
Act (73 Fed. Reg. at 12156 n.1), the Administrator may not avoid the legal 
and regulatory consequences of his factual findings simply by refusing to 
give them the label of “endangerment.”  EPA has long acknowledged, and 
courts have long agreed, that formal factual findings of the kind made by 
EPA in the waiver decision suffice to trigger regulatory obligations under 
the Clean Air Act. 
 
 In prior administrations, EPA did not even contest the idea that formal 
factual conclusions concerning the public health or welfare effects of a 
pollutant constituted an endangerment finding under the Clean Air Act.  The 
regulation of lead provides an instructive example.  Before regulating lead as 
a fuel additive under section 211 of the Clean Air Act, EPA first found that 
lead was endangering public health.  38 Fed. Reg. 33734.  EPA was then 
faced with a lawsuit arguing that this endangerment finding required EPA to 
set air quality standards for lead under section 108 of the Clean Air Act.  In 
that lawsuit, EPA conceded that lead had an adverse effect on public health 
and welfare within the meaning of section 108 of the Act.  NRDC v. Train, 
                                                                                                                                                 
to, much less calls into question, the Administrator’s prediction regarding 
ozone exposure and premature mortality. 
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545 F.2d 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1976).  EPA made no attempt to deny that a 
formal finding of lead’s harmful effects made pursuant to one provision of 
the statute was decisive for purposes of a separate provision of the Act. 
 
 EPA’s previous acknowledgment that a formal finding of danger to 
public health or welfare amounts to an endangerment finding with regulatory 
significance under the Clean Air Act is fully supported in the case law.  In 
the lawsuit challenging the lead standard for fuel, industry argued that “the 
regulations were void because the Administrator had failed to couch his 
ultimate finding in the language of the statute itself.”  Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 
541 F.2d 1, 12 n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).  Calling the argument 
“spurious,” the court pointed out that “ultimate findings do not have to be 
expressed at all, let alone be expressed in the language of the statute.”  541 
F.2d at 12 n.15.  In Thomas v. State of New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 
1986), the court faced the question whether two letters from the EPA 
Administrator to public officials, concluding that acid deposition from U.S. 
sources was endangering public welfare in Canada, sufficed as a finding that 
U.S. emissions were endangering public health or welfare in a foreign 
country within the meaning of section 115(a) of the Clean Air Act.  The 
court said they no; rather, it concluded, the Administrator should have 
followed notice-and-comment procedures in issuing his findings.  802 F.2d 
at 1447.   
 
 Together, these authorities stand for two important propositions.  
First, the fact that Administrator Johnson did not label his conclusions an 
“endangerment finding” does not dilute their legal significance.  
Administrator Johnson used those conclusions as support for a momentous 
regulatory decision, that is, the decision denying California and other states 
the ability to enact programs to address greenhouse gases from motor 
vehicles.  The Administrator may not disavow those conclusions in another 
legal setting simply because they are inconvenient in that other setting.  
Second, procedures matter.  Administrator Johnson announced that climate 
change is upon us and that its consequences will be harmful, only after 
providing notice and an opportunity for public comment.  He signed the 
announcement himself and published it in the Federal Register.  Short of 
affixing a wax seal to the document, Johnson could not have made a more 
formal announcement about the causes and consequences of climate change 
than he did in denying California’s waiver. 
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IV.  The Regulatory Implications of the Endangerment Finding  
 
 The Clean Air Act directs EPA Administrator to regulate numerous 
sources of air pollution once he has found that an air pollutant emitted by 
them may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.  In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court explicitly held that regulation of 
motor vehicles under section 202 of the Clean Air Act must follow once the 
EPA Administrator makes such an endangerment finding.  127 S.Ct. at 1462.  
The same is true for many other sources of air pollution. 
 
 Section 111(b)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, for example, provides that 
EPA “shall” include on a list a category of stationary sources “if in his 
judgment it causes, or contributes significantly to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”  42 U.S.C. 
7411(b)(1)(A).  Section 111(b)(1)(B) requires the Administrator to regulate 
new sources included on this list.  42 U.S.C. 7411(b)(1)(B).  Section 111(d) 
requires the Administrator, acting in concert with the States, to regulate 
existing sources included on this list.  42 U.S.C. 7411(d).  There is little 
doubt that many categories of stationary sources – including, for example, 
power plants – emit greenhouse gases and thus “cause[]” air pollution which 
the Administrator has concluded endangers public health and welfare.  
Under section 111, the Administrator “shall” include these sources on a list 
and then “shall” regulate them.  42 U.S.C. 7411(b)(1)(A), 7411(b)(1)(B), 
7411(d).   
 
 Regarding power plants specifically, in 2006, EPA refused to regulate 
greenhouse gases from electric utility and several other steam generating 
units under section 111 because, the agency explained, “it does not presently 
have the authority to regulate CO2 or other greenhouse gases that contribute 
to global climate change.”  71 Fed. Reg. 9866, 9869.  After Massachusetts v. 
EPA, this reasoning is no longer legally valid.  The D.C. Circuit has 
remanded a challenge to EPA’s decision to the agency.  In light of the 
reasoning set forth above, EPA must now regulate greenhouse gases from 
these sources. 
 
 Similarly, section 231(a)(2)(A) provides that the Administrator “shall” 
issue proposed standards for “the emission of any air pollutant from any 
class or classes of aircraft engines which in his judgment causes, or 
contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare.”  42 U.S.C. 7571(a)(2)(A).  Currently 
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pending before EPA are two petitions asking EPA to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions from aircraft.  (California filed one petition, which is available 
at http://cdn.sfgate.com/gate/pictures/2007/12/05/ga_aircraftpet6.pdf.  
Environmental groups filed another, available at 
http://cdn.sfgate.com/gate/pictures/2007/12/05/ga_aircraftghgpet.pdf.)   
 
 Provisions regarding the regulation of fuels (42 U.S.C. 7545(c)(1)(A)) 
and nonroad engines (42 U.S.C. 7547(a)(4)) provide somewhat more 
discretion to the Administrator because they state that he “may” rather than 
“shall” regulate after a finding of endangerment.  Nevertheless, the 
Administrator will need to take into account his finding of endangerment in 
explaining his course of action under these provisions.  Here, too, a petition 
to regulate greenhouse gases (in this case, from nonroad engines) awaits a 
response from EPA.  (The petition is available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_pdfs/press/N1474_Petition.pdf.)  As the Supreme 
Court said in Massachusetts v. EPA, in responding to a petition for 
rulemaking, the agency’s “reasons for action or inaction must conform to the 
authorizing statute,” and EPA must offer a “reasoned explanation” for its 
decisions.  127 S.Ct. at 1462, 1463.  Thus, the mere existence of some 
discretion on the part of EPA, suggested by the inclusion of the word “may” 
with respect to regulation of fuels and nonroad engines, does not dilute the 
agency’s general obligation to follow statutory criteria and explain its 
decisions in reasoned terms. 
 
V.  EPA’s Obligation to Make an Endangerment Determination 
 
 If, contrary to my belief, the EPA Administrator’s formal factual 
findings about the causes and consequences of climate change do not 
amount to an endangerment finding triggering an obligation to regulate, then 
EPA must issue a decision as to whether endangerment exists in order to 
respond to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.  Almost a 
year ago, the Supreme Court directed the agency to provide a lawful 
explanation as to why it would or would not regulate greenhouse gases from 
motor vehicles.  The agency’s options, under the Court’s decision, are 
limited.  So far, however, the agency has not – again, assuming for the 
moment that EPA’s findings on the causes and consequences of climate 
change do not constitute a finding of “endangerment” – exercised any of the 
lawful options presented by the Court.  Utter inaction is not one of the 
options the Court permitted. 
 
 10
 11
 A little over a month after the Court issued its decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the President issued an Executive Order directing 
EPA and the Departments of Transportation and Energy to undertake a 
coordinated effort to develop regulations to “protect the environment with 
respect to greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, nonroad vehicles, 
and nonroad engines.”  Executive Order: Cooperation Among Agencies in 
Protecting the Environment with Respect to Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
From  Motor Vehicles, Nonroad Vehicles, and Nonroad Engines (May 14, 
2007), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007.  At a press 
conference announcing the Executive Order, referring to the entire process 
of developing final regulations for motor vehicles, President Bush stated that 
he had “directed members of [his] administration to complete the process by 
the end of 2008.” (A transcript of the press conference is available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070514-4.html.)  Yet 
here it is, March of 2007, and EPA continues to insist not only that it has 
made no endangerment finding but that it need not provide a specific 
timeline for doing so. 
 
 It has been nine years since the International Center for Technology 
Assessment and other groups asked EPA to regulate greenhouse gases from 
motor vehicles due to the threat they posed to public health and welfare.  In 
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, the petitioners had also 
waited nine years for an answer to their request that the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration regulate workplace exposures to hexavalent 
chromium.  The court observed:  “[I]n no reported case has a court 
reviewed a delay this long without compelling action.”  314 F.3d 143, 152 
(3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).  Under any understanding of the 
obligations of an agency not to engage in “unreasonable delay,” EPA has 
tarried too long.   
